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In an important essay entitled "Ethics and the Control of Retar-
dates,"l B. F. Skinner has outlined some of his opinions about the 
nature of ethical reflection and about policies which should determine 
the treatment of retarded persons. It is good to see a policy-maker like 
Skinner address himself to ethics, since it is clear that ethical prin-
ciples play crucial roles in policy formation.2 Yet, even though he 
discusses ethics in his essay, like many self-styled, tough-minded 
empiricists, Skinner believes that scientific facts, not moral reasoning, 
determine how people behave. 
Skinner says that ethics should be equated with feelings and moods 
which are reflected in terms like "caring" or "moral outrage." He then 
dismisses these feeliJlgs as largely ineffective. They are ineffective 
because they are derivatives of the forces which truly shape human 
conduct, namely contingencies of psychological reinforcement. When 
he then sets forth his policies regarding the retarded, Skinner feels free 
to set aside feelings or ethical opinions as relevant for the shaping of 
human behavior. His thesis is that the design and manipulation of 
psychological reinforcements are the only effective ways to control the 
behavior of retarded humans. 
In the light of my differences with certain of these opinions, and 
my curiosity about the nature of Skinner's moral thought, I propose 
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to accomplish three things in this essay: 1) to show that in spite of his 
denials, Skinner operates with an unconscious, yet nevertheless clearly 
identifiable set of ethical principles - sections one and two; 2) to 
demonstrate that Skinner's ethics play a crucial role in his policy 
formation - section three; and 3) to highlight several problems which 
appear in B. F. Skinner's ethics generally and his policies concerning 
retarded persons specifically - section four. 
1. Skinner's Metaethics 
Upon reading his essay on the treatment of the retarded, it is clear 
that Skinner, rather than understanding himself as indulging in moral 
reasoning, views himself as a psychologist-scientist who can explain 
why humans engage in ethical thinking and in tum can explain how 
ineffectual that thinking is. This is the case because Skinner reduces 
ethical language to various kinds of reinforcements. The words "good" 
and "bad, " the sense of duty, the feelings of obligations, approval, 
anger, and so on, all reflect how human behavior "has been shaped 
and maintained by earlier consequences" or reinforcements.3 Ethical 
utterances are essentially verbal ejaculations which reflect condition-
ing reinforcers or adversive stimuli in the same way that feelings are 
"by-products" of the reinforcements which shape behavior. In his 
book Beyond Freedom and Dignity, Skinner crisply put ethical judg-
ments in their place: "To make a value judgment by calling something 
good or bad is to classify it in terms of its reinforcing effects." 4 This 
reduction of feeling and one of its verbal manifestations - ethical 
language - to the status of a byproduct of environmental contin-
gencies is also reflected in Skinner's statements about stealing and 
mistreatment in his essay on the retarded. 
B. F. Skinner's analysis of the sources of ethical language demon-
strates that he regards himself as a noncognitivist. That is, Skinner 
does not believe that humans truly and cognitively judge between 
good and bad with active intellects capable of weighing dialectical 
(good-bad) decisions.5 His noncognitivism is rooted in his empiricism 
and operant behaviorism in which all human behavior is regarded as 
contingent upon material, environmental feedback. Throughout his 
writings, he vigorously rejects any "pre-scientific" position which per-
sonifies the inner states and thoughts and feelings of humans. Personi-
fications of human beings are "part of the armamentarium of autono-
mous man" whom, from the standpoint of operant behaviorism, Skin-
ner purports to have vanquished. 6 
Consistent with noncognitivism, Skinner insists that moral censor-
ship is invalid. He claims that only environments and genes are bad, 
not people. As he says, a "scientific analysis shifts the credit as well as 
the blame to the environment."7 
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Behind this moral neutrality lies Skinnerean determinism: humans 
who have no autonomous freedom from their respective environments 
cannot be blamed or credited for their actions.S Value judgments con-
cerning people, including those who behave in any fashion toward 
retarded persons, thus should be avoided. 9 
Determinism and N oncognitivism 
Skinner's determinism and its ethical partner, noncognitivism, serve 
as fundamental tenets in his approach to criminals, the retarded, and 
those who appear to be "insensitive" in their handling of the retarded. 
His proposals for improving the care of any of these groups thus 
center on manipulation of institutional environments, not the instil-
ling of higher ethical values. 
Although Skinner identifies himself with an ethical position which 
must be designated noncognitivist, he vigorously distinguishes his posi-
tion from that of noncognitivists like A. J. Ayer and C. L. Stevenson. 
Ayer and Stevenson were noncognitive emotivists who regarded ethi-
cal utterances as arising out of feeling. As "simply expressions of 
emotion," these utterances have no authentic, truth-claiming validity, 
claimed Ayer.10 Versus noncognitive emotivists, Skinner claims that 
ethical sentences do not evince or express feelings. He argues that both 
ethical utterances and feelings are derivations or byproducts of the 
reinforcements affecting behavior. Two of the basic categories of these 
reinforcements are 1) personal reinforcers, such as food, drink, and 
sex, and 2) social reinforcers, by which humans are praised and 
rewarded depending on whether their behavior is considered impor-
tant by the group. 
Because of his emphasis on social reinforcers, Skinner can hold - as 
he does in his presentation on retardation - that ethical utterances are 
not merely reflections of personal reinforcers. ll As part of the social-
ly reinforcing context, ethical pronouncements may become rein-
forcers themselves. Ethical statements are nevertheless secondary or 
weak reinforcers, both because they are derived from non-verbal rein-
forcements and because they merely reflect or are determined by past 
influences from the environment. 
In addition to noncognitivism, B. F. Skinner regards himself as a 
relativist. He says, for example: 
Each culture has its own set of goods, and what is good in one culture 
may not be good in another. To recognize this is to take the position of 
"cultural relativism ." What is good for the Trobriand Islander is good for 
the Trobriand Islander, and that is .that. 12 
Skinner is saying that "X is right" is equal in meaning to "X is a 
reflection of the reinforcing contingencies of the speaker." Thus, even 
as environmental reinforcements vary and change, so also what 
humans call "good" and "bad" change. Presumably, two speakers rep-
resenting two different sets of reinforcing environments may well have 
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different meanings for the term " good" without either speaker's being 
wrong. Each is using "good" with regard to his own relative set of 
reinforcements. 
By regarding nature - in this case natural reinforcements or con-
tingencies - as subject to significant variation and change, this form of 
nature-based metaethics offers a surprising twist to other nature-based 
theories, all of which are forms of absolutism, not relativism. Never-
theless, Skinner's relativism is compatible with that of numerous social 
scientists who regard ethical maxims and norms as relative to respec-
tive cultural and environmental conditions. 13 
Skinner a N oncognitive Relativist 
According to his own self-understanding, B. F. Skinner should be 
identified as a noncognitive relativist. Yet, since noncognitivists hold 
that humans do not make independent mental judgments or assertions 
about that which is right and that which is wrong, we may well ques-
tion whether the terms "relativist" or "absolutist" should be applied 
to a noncognitivist metaethical position. In Skinner's case, however, a 
relativist-absolutist distinction seems important because it highlights 
his conviction that ethical statements are relative to reinforcers which 
vary significantly, even though he regards these utterances as having 
no independent cognitive validity. A noncognitive absolutist would 
then presumably identify ethical utterances with a set of non-varying 
causes. 
To put the matter plainly, the problem with Skinner's ethical self-
understanding is that he is neither a relativist nor a noncognitivist. His 
essays and social proposals, for example, are saturated with implicit 
absolutism. He does not regard the "good" about which he talks as 
merely relative to some specific social group, and hence only appli-
cable for that group or for himself and those whose environmental 
reinforcements are exactly like his. Nor are Skinner's proposals set 
forth merely for those who volunteer to live in communities like 
Walden II, or for Americans alone, or even Westerners exclusively. 
Skinner is in fact surrounded by a majority of intellectuals whose 
definitions of human "well-being" include the notions of cognitive 
freedom and individual autonomy. Yet, instead of saying that their 
definitions of well-being are relatively correct because they reflect 
dominant views and reinforcements of their society, Skinner calls their 
thinking pre-scientific, fictional, endowed with "some fatal flaw," and 
so forth.14 
Skinner's ethical absolutism appears at numerous points in his writ-
ings. One example is evident in his chapter on "Punishment" in Be-
yond Freedom and Dignity. In this chapter Skinner sketches in ghastly 
and powerful detail the horrors of torture and imprisonment. The 
entire thrust of his essay is that such treatment is inherently wrong. 
And he maintains that since punishment in somewhat milder forms is 
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acceptable to the advocates of freedom and autonomy (if a person is 
responsible for his wrong deeds, he should be punished), those advo-
cates, even though they are in the majority, are wrong.15 A second 
example of his absolutism appears in his essay on retarded persons. He 
refuses to be satisfied either with the care which was or is commonly 
accepted by society, or with the kind of care which would result from 
treating the retarded according to the positive reinforcements which 
normal, middle-class Americans find most satisfying. Retarded persons 
should be given food and leisure and entertainment only in accord 
with a set of absolute norms which Skinner believes are right and good 
for all. 
Implicit, yet definitive, in B. F. Skinner's metaethics is an ingen-
ious, unique form of nature-based absolutism. Indeed, one of the 
reasons why Skinner seems so willing and anxious to propose social 
reforms is that he holds tenaciously to a form of ethical absolutism. 
The definition of "good" that constantly and implicitly underlies 
Skinner's reasoning is grounded in his understanding of the evolu-
tion of sensate life. He schematizes "good" into an ascending moral 
order based on the ultimate norm that good is that which is in accord 
with evolutionary progress. 16 His ascending order proceeds as follows: 
in the first place, immediate or personal reinforcers are good. They are 
good because evolution began and achieved significant force through 
the ability of creatures to sort out what was personally reinforcing 
from things (food, drink) and from one's fellow species (maternal 
warmth, sex, and so on). All other reinforcers derive their power from 
these. 17 On the basis of these reinforcers, animals became aware of 
the consequences of their behavior in relation to their respective 
environments, and this awareness or sensitivity is the dynamic key to 
evolutionary progress. I8 Nevertheless, Skinner judges personal rein-
forcers as possessing limited goodness. Upon them alone evolution 
would not have proceeded very far: no effective degree of behavior 
emitted; 19 no powerful, complexly-organized cultures developed; no 
status beyond savagery achieved. 
In the second place, social or conditional reinforcers are better, 
even though "they derive their power from personal reinforcers." 20 
These are reinforcers which influence humans to act "for the good of 
others," and include such factors as verbal reinforcements (praise, en-
couragement, moral utterances), ceremonies, and the actions of 
humans within numerous social institutions - educational, religious, 
political, economic. Although social reinforcers are less immediately 
gratifying, they have become more powerful than many personal rein-
forcements among the human species. 21 Controlled by their social 
environments, humans achieved extraordinary skill and power in the 
evolutionary process. They have learned to accumulate and transmit 
their learning and have moved to entirely new levels of self-manage-
ment, security, health, and wisdom. 
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Remote Consequences, Deferred Reinforcements 
In the third place, sensitivity to remote consequences in hopes of 
deferred reinforcements is best. This sensitivity is indebted to personal 
and social reinforcements,22 but is not dependent on any current 
reinforcers. It is perceived as important, Skinner argues, because the 
most sensitive and successful creatures are more and more aware of 
the consequences of their behavior, and they somehow realize or are 
taught that their species could perish. Skinner seems aware that on the 
basis of perceiving "good" in terms of reinforcements, humans hardly 
have many reasons for regarding the survival of their culture as the 
highest "good." 23 He refuses, of course, to base their concern for 
survival value on factors like "feelings of loyalty," which for him are 
only reflections of contingencies. Perhaps genetic factors are in-
volved. 24 Some reinforcers do, after all, depend on significant time 
lapses, such as how insurance policies are paid up after one's death, 
how five-year plans call for the suspension of gratification in hopes 
that greater gains will later ensue, and how religious concepts of the 
afterlife influence human action now.25 He also knows through exper-
imentation that strongly reinforced animals versus those weakly rein-
forced with regular personal gratification persist in working without 
continuous rewards. Nevertheless, in the last analysis, Skinner argues 
that ultimate sensitivity to the remote consequences of cultural sur-
vival is something that simply happens or will happen in the cultures 
that survive. This is exceedingly close to his saying circuitously that 
cultural survival is a self-evident truth for those chosen ones destined 
to survive. 26 
Skinner comes close to defining his implicit metaethics in a rather 
offhand assertion that there "is a kind of natural morality in both 
biological and cultural evolution." 27 For Skinner that is precisely the 
case. "Good" is defined ultimately as equal in meaning to those 
dynamics of evolution which are responsible for human progress. In 
ethical parlance, Skinner's metaethics is that of nature-based absolut-
ism. Inherent good is identified with processes intrinsic to nature. 
Nevertheless, Skinner's highest norm of human survival, coupled with 
his attributing moral significance to the psychological processes 
behind evolution, allows him to select with great care which things 
from nature are good, better, and best. His metaethical principles keep 
him from identifying "good" with a single definition of "Nature's 
way," such as the norm "survival of the fittest" for numerous Social 
Darwinians. Yet, he still attributes ultimate value to natural processes. 
He would not agree with the counsel of T. H. Huxley that "the ethical 
progress of society depends, not on imitating the cosmic process, still 
less in running away from it, but in combating it. "28 
Even as Skinner is not a relativist, so also he is not a noncognitivist. 
Here again the ethical beliefs which Skinner theoretically abstracts 
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from his psychological theory contradict those fundamental beliefs 
which underlie his analysis. For example, in our discussion above con-
cerning Skinner's absolutism, it is clear that his highest definition of 
good - namely human sensitivity to the ultimate evolutionary conse-
quences of their behavior - is based on cognition, not on any current, 
noncognitive reinforcers. 29 Humans cannot, of course, be reinforced 
by their eventual extinction. They can only deduce, perceive, or 
imagine it is possible. The ultimate sensitivity to the remote conse-
quences of cultural survival is clearly a cognitive, perceptual category, 
and the crediting of this sensitivity with ultimate ethical good is some-
thing that Skinner has deduced from a complex, intellectual analysis 
of biological, psychological, historical, and philosophical information.30 
2. Normative Ethics 
Distinguishing Skinner's theoretical noncognitive relativism from his 
actual cognitive absolutism makes it possible for us clearly to under-
stand and explicate his normative ethical statements from an other-
wise bewildering array of "shoulds" and "oughts." His normative 
ethical statements represent positions which include hedonism, altru-
ism, egalitarianism, rule-keeping, and tolerant relativism. Our challenge 
is to understand and display accurately and critically Skinner's ethical 
priorities, and thus to build a foundation for showing why Skinner 
proposes certain policies with regard to the treatment of retarded 
persons and others. 
Skinner's normative ethics reflect precisely the hierarchical ordering 
of moral "goods" displayed in his metaethical principles. He regards 
personal reinforcements as good, and hence talks at times in hedon-
istic terms. He says that he has enjoyed the pleasures of an "hedonistic 
ethic," and further asserts that in order for a culture to gain the 
"support of its members," it ought to "provide for pursuit and 
achievement of happiness. "31 Nevertheless, the thrust of Skinner's 
ethics opposes the maximization of personal pleasure. As he says in 
several contexts, including his statement on retardation, personal rein-
forcements alone have as their consequence the production "at best 
[of] only a 'feral' child" who is unable to compete strongly in the 
evolutionary process. In defense of this point of view, Skinner initiates 
a caustic critique of satiated, pleasure-gratifying hedonism, which he re-
gards not as productive of useful, effective behavior, but rather as re-
sponsible for the environmental crisis and for many of the world's S9cial 
pro blems. 32 It is little wonder that Skinner proposes that retarded per-
sons ought not to be surrounded with leisure and gratification. 
Behavior which contributes to the common good is better, because, 
as noted above, it furthers evolutionary success and survival. All 
humans - gifted, normal, retarded - ought, therefore, to seek to max-
imize what is socially reinforcing: to engage in efficient and produc-
tive labor, to contribute to socially-useful knowledge and technical 
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skills, to abide by rules and laws which reinforce the control of the 
social fabric, to develop greater self-management, to cease using 
punishment, and to promote a certain degree of justice.33 The last 
two of these norms deserve special attention. 
Skinner argues that humans ought not to punish each other, not 
because it is inherently wrong on cognitive or emotional grounds 
(which he regards as byproducts of human behavior), but because 
punishment does not produce efficient, useful behavior. Unlike posi-
tive and negative reinforcements, punishment, rather than encouraging 
or releasing "more reinforcing activities," decreases response, produc-
ing excessive timidity, anxiety, and a lack of adventurousness. 34 It is 
also inefficient in that the punisher has to be present continually in 
order to effect behavioral change. 
Behind this critique of punishment is not deontological moral out-
rage, but the utilitarian principle that punishment does not produce 
the best consequences. And for Skinner, the norm for assessing these 
consequences is not maximized happiness, but maximized behavior 
which will most likely lead to evolutionary progress and survival. Pun-
ishment discourages this type of behavior. It is therefore inherently 
bad in Skinner's naturalistic schema which values evolutionary prog-
ress as ultimately or inherently right. 
The role of some notion of justice in Skinnerean thought deserves 
further investigation. His conception of a utopian social community 
contains a degree of social and economic egalitarianism which exceeds 
that of contemporary democratic or socialist societies. A society in 
which menial labor is to be rewarded handsomely and professionally-
enjoyable tasks much less reinforced is surely "more humanistic" than 
some of Skinner's critics have allowed.35 Skinner furthermore praises 
"a democracy" in which the "controller of culture" places himself 
among the controlled. Yet he also senses that behavioral engineering 
does not logically and naturally need to proceed along democratic 
lines.36 It may well be asked whether Skinner's egalitarian norm is 
logically grounded in his moral thought or whether in fact his form of 
egalitarianism seems "just." 37 
What Humans Should Do 
Behavior which is predicated on a concern for cultural survival is 
best. So what ought humans to do? They ought to act, to work, to 
design, to make things and change things creatively, regularly, effi-
ciently. They ought to behave like scientists who are not constantly 
reinforced by personal gratification, but are reinforced sparingly by 
incremental rewards and motivated by the remote consequences of 
cultural survival. 38 
In the context of talking about behavioral engineering, Skinner's 
ultimate normative ethical standard is most clearly seen. We must 
design a "better world," that is, one which is in keeping with the 
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dynamics of evolutionary progress. Its "wonderful possibilities" in-
clude the following: motivation via positive reinforcements, not adver-
sive, punishing ones; human willingness to become self-controlled for 
the sake of the common good; diverse and new yet carefully planned 
forms of art, music, literature, and even religion; and inventive con-
cern for new technologies which further human survival possibilities. 
Only in these ways will humans continue literally to shape their own 
destinies in accord with past evolutionary progress. 39 
B. F. Skinner's highest set of "oughts" have altruistic connotations. 
The "designer of culture" is not to act primarily for his own imme-
diate good, nor for those of his friends and contemporaries, but for 
the good of those yet to be born. Although he may enjoy certain 
hedonistic pleasures and receive degrees of gratitude or reinforcement 
from his human contemporaries, he works vicariously. Yet in the final 
analysis, he cannot be credited with a "more finely developed ethical 
sense," for he ultimately reflects only the environment which molded 
him. 40 
It is now evident how Skinner's normative ethics, like his meta-
ethics, is based on a norm selected from the natural order. We ought 
to act in ways which are in keeping with the laws of nature, but not in 
the same accidental and inefficient way that this process has unfolded 
in the past. Skinner is not simply a Social Darwinist like Herbert 
Spencer, for Skinner opposes forms of Social Darwinism or develop-
mentalism which encourage humans "to stand around and wait." 41 
He will countenance no resignation to the cosmic process. 
In technical ethical categories, Skinner emerges as an eccentric, 
pluralistic-rule utilitarian. His normative ethical judgments are con-
stantly made on the basis of maximized consequences. And although 
he clearly esteems a plurality of "goods," his ultimate principle of 
cultural survival becomes a norm or rule by which all other "goods" 
are evaluated. 
3. The Treatment of Retarded Persons 
Now that the distinction between B. F. Skinner's theoretical non-
cognitive relativism and actual cognitive, nature-based absolutism is 
exhibited, we have a clear conceptual foundation for understanding 
his policy proposals and ethical evaluations. We shall use his proposals 
regarding the treatment of retarded persons as a case in point. 
Skinner argues, with respect to institutions for the retarded, that 
reform efforts based on the premise that moralistic feelings and moral 
codes are substantial and influential are bound to fail. Such reforms 
are both ineffective and misleading. They are ineffective because 
ethics reflect environmental contingencies rather than shape or reform 
them. If institutional environments are arranged so that reform-pro-
ducing counter controls (or reinforcing contingencies) directly affect 
those who work in them, then what is considered ethically responsible 
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behavior will automatically ensue. If effective counter controls are 
absent, no amount of moralism or reform-oriented procedures will 
suffice. 
These reforms are misleading because without a knowledge of 
behavioral psychology, reformers confuse what is reinforcing to them-
selves with what may be reinforcing to retarded persons. Moral 
reformers who are following such highly-valued maxims as the Golden 
Rule of Christianity ("Do unto others as you would have them do unto 
you") or Marxism's social maxim ("To each according to his need"), 
find leisure and relaxation reinforcing. But these are not truly rein-
forcing for retarded persons. 42 What they need are not the "weak" 
reinforcers of leisure, gratification, and consumption, but "some pow-
erful reinforcers by which the human species evolved and survived. "43 
At this point, Skinner's nature-based absolutism surfaces with great 
force. He is not content for retarded persons to be treated in any 
number of ways relative to numerous types of environments. They 
should not live hedonistic lives. Those who work with them should 
not follow the moral maxims of Christian or Marxist reciprocity. The 
retarded must be controlled by the "strong" reinforcements which 
have and will enable the human species to triumph in the evolutionary 
process. An example of a strong reinforcement is that of eating. If the 
retarded are given food only if they behave in certain ways, they will 
soon learn to "behave productively," that is, behave in ways that 
contribute "to the continuing evolution ... of culture. "44 The behav-
ior of the retarded is "good" if it conforms with the behavior which 
has enabled the human species to evolve to its present status. The 
"good life" for retarded humans is not comprised of leisure and grat-
ification, but of social skills, greater personal independence, and 
accomplishments in art, sports, and science. 45 
So how should our institutional policies regarding the control of the 
retarded be formed? They should be formed not by moral feeling or 
caring, nor by the consensus which emerges from the clashing opinions 
of self-interest groups, as depicted, for example, in the ethics of Rein-
hold Niebuhr. Policies regarding retarded persons should be set by 
behavior scientists who recognize the ultimate "importance of produc-
tive labor for the strength of the culture" and who "can take the 
remote consequences of the environment into account. "46 That is, in 
the light of the ultimate consequence that the human species may not 
survive, behavioral psychologists know that humans ought most of all 
to be productive, to invent, and to contribute to culture so that 
annihilation will not occur; and they will design human environments 
accordingly. There is hardly a better example of the influence of B. F. 
Skinner's ethics on his policy proposals than on this point. Policies 
regarding the retarded must conform to natural evolution and must be 
constantly informed by the ultimate consequences resulting from 
human behavior. They must, that is, conform to Skinner's form of 
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nature-based, rule utilitarianism. 
Skinner asks at one point whether it is ethical to do research on 
psychotics and the retarded without their consent. His answer is yes. 
It is for their "ultimate good" that such research is done; and it is 
through this research that they will be able to "make a real contribu-
tion" to a world in which others like themselves will live. 4 7 His justifi-
cation for experimentation without consent is grounded in conse-
quentialism. The ultimate consequences of such experimentation for 
the good of the world outweigh any moral qualms against inducing or 
forcing them "to participate as subjects of research." 48 
In dealing fairly with Skinner's proposals, we should refer briefly to 
the kinds of controls that he advocates for the purposes of changing 
humans. He does not wish these controls to be inhuman or dictatorial, 
and perhaps only time will unravel the ultimate consequences of Skin-
ner's own proposals. Normal humans, argues Skinner, should not be 
changed in harmful or punishing ways against their wills. (Skinner, of 
course, would not use the term "will.") Skinner furthermore believes 
that change is to occur in piecemeal fashion, primarily as people are 
won over to, not forced to accept, the virtues of his plan. As we have 
just seen, however, he does not believe that retarded persons and 
psychotics need to be "won over" or convinced before experimenta-
tion can be done on them. Nor should the new order be uniform and 
unchanging - although diversity and change ought to be carefully 
planned and monitored. 49 Finally, rather than having the character-
istics of an unnatural, uncanny order, Skinner's "I:>~tter world" theo-
retically is continuous with natural evolutionary processes. 50 
The mechanism for effecting change is the use of extensive controls, 
and "control" has positive connotations for Skinner. He asserts that 
the "intentional design of a culture and the control it implies are 
essential if the human species is to continue to develop." 51 He thus 
justifies the use of control by his highest ethical norm of human 
progress and survival. He supports this emphasis on control with two 
other points. Since environments determine behavior anyway, it 
makes more sense to use identifiable, rationalized norms of con-
trol. 52 And given the present social-environmental crisis, it is now 
necessary to hasten the pace of cultural evolution. This cannot be 
accomplished without control. 
4. Critique 
Before focusing on selected problems in Skinner's ethics generally 
and his proposals regarding retarded persons specifically, I should 
emphasize that certain of his ideas regarding the treatment of severely 
retarded humans appear to me to deserve serious, if not enthusiastic, 
consideration. Operant behaviorism appears to make truly significant 
contributions to our understanding of human and animal beh!lvior, 
and hence should be utilized toward moral ends. The criticisms offered 
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in this essay are thus to be construed as pointing to the problematic 
moral character of certain of Skinner's ethical opinions as well as to 
the problematic claims of omniscience made on behalf of thorough-
going, deterministic behaviorism. 
Furthermore, certain of Skinner's proposals, quite apart from his 
own ethical positions, hold promise for the development and well-
being of many severely handicapped, retarded persons. For example, 
Skinner's highlighting of the need to distinguish between what rein-
forces retarded humans and what reinforces humans with normal or 
above normal abilities can be utilized as a valuable procedural insight 
for the influencing and motivating of the retarded, even as it is for the 
maturation and rearing of children. The question then becomes, 
"influence and motivate to do what for which reasons?" This places us 
squarely in the middle of normative ethics, and it is at this point that 
the norms of justice, gratitude, and so on, call into question the 
granting of ultimate value to the norm of evolutionary survival, as will 
be developed shortly. 
Operant behaviorism can even be regarded as compatible with the 
kind of justice or reciprocity set forth in the Golden Rule. In his essay 
on the retarded, Skinner suggests that this rule conflicts with operant 
behaviorism because it means that we are to reinforce others with the 
same things that reinforced us. Skinner argues that those who follow 
the Golden Rule will thus seek to provide retarded persons with too 
much leisure and gratification. However, the reciprocity of this rule 
may just as adequately emphasize that we are to allow others to be 
reinforced to the degree that we wish to be reinforced. Reciprocity 
thus means that we are to share work and responsibility even as we are 
to share justly health, gratification, and personal fulfillment. Operant 
behaviorism is thus not a method which can be used only in con-
junction with Skinnerean utilitarianism. 
Three problem areas regarding Skinner's ethics and proposals call 
for particular attention. First, and genuinely problematic, is Skinner's 
lack of specificity concerning who are the psychotics and retarded 
persons about whom he is speaking. To be sure, vegetating human 
organisms and severely retarded individuals have been led to develop 
certain basic human skills through behavior modification. 53 Neverthe-
less, the great majority of retarded humans fall into an IQ range of 
from 50- 70; and many of these individuals, once freed from the 
stereotypes of many public school contexts, seem to lead "normal" 
lives as housewives, blue-collar workers, small farmers, and so 
on. 54 Without question, moral problems are raised with respect to 
their bearing children and their social roles in society, but surely any 
wholesale dismissal of their right to consent to experimentation is 
replete with social and moral difficulties. 
This criticism is supplemented by a second set of criticisms associ-
ated with Skinner's form of rule utilitarianism. Two of the crucial 
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problems for any utilitarian or teleological ethical position are those 
involving victimization and the sanctioning of "heinous crimes." Hed-
onistic utilitarians have been greatly criticized on these grounds. If the 
right act is that which produces the greatest happiness for the greatest 
number, innocent persons can be victimized. On similar grounds, 
shocking crimes, such as the classic example of giving a poisoned piece 
of candy to a child, might not be prohibited. Surely the prima facie 
horror that such a crime evokes is at least greatly diminished when the 
morality of this act is assessed by its ultimate consequences. Rule 
utilitarianism developed precisely as an attempt to meet these kinds of 
objections to purely consequentialist reasoning. 
Problematic Utilitarianism 
Now if teleological reasoning poses problems for utilitarianism gen-
erally, as I believe it does, the kind of utilitarianism espoused by 
Skinner seems exceedingly problematic. Skinner's ethics gives the 
highest value to the remotest consequences of human behavior and has 
as a rule the principle of the survival of the species, not the individual. 
Skinner's form of rule utilitarianism thus intensifies, rather than eases, 
the ethical problems of ordinary utilitarianism. 
Why, on grounds of the survival of the species, should the weak, the 
infirm, the retarded, the psychotic, or even the less intelligent or less 
virile be protected, or even preserved? And if evolutionary progress is 
due to increasing animal sensitivity to the consequences of behavior, 
as it is for Skinner, it would logically follow that retarded persons or 
everyone with sub-normal or perhaps not terribly high intellects could 
be regarded as distinct liabilities to social progress. On Skinnerean 
grounds, how would their presence be justified? One possible justifica-
tion would be that they could contribute to human evolution by 
becoming the subjects of experimental research. This point, unfortu-
nately, has not been lost on Skinner or other operant behaviorists.55 
We have seen that in his essay on the retarded, Skinner has little 
concern for the consent of the retarded or mentally-ill individual. His 
survival-oriented, consequentialist reasoning leads to a disregard of 
their "rights." 
Skinner's consequentialist ethics raises further problems with 
respect to the protection, or lack of it, of normally intelligent and 
healthy individuals. This is true because Skinner's thought has no set 
of safeguards for the individual parallel to that of normative ethical 
theories that stress individual rights, the treatment of individuals only 
as ends in themselves, or a set of prima facie moral norms in which 
agreements and obligations are implicitly valued. In Skinner's thought 
the individual is jeopardized in a number of ways. Determinism says 
that he or she has no inherent personal uniqueness. Evolutionary con-
sequentialism says that he or she has "only a minor bearing on the 
survival of the culture," and therefore is given a largely inconsequen-
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tial status. 56 And Skinner's great emphasis on control raises far-reach-
ing questions about the nature and extent of individual deviance 
which might be considered acceptable to the group. 
The problem of individual deviance becomes acute when the new 
social order presumably exercises social control only by positive rein-
forcements, not by negative prohibitions or punishments. This new 
social order might at first sight be considered humane, but it becomes 
questionably virtuous upon closer scrutiny. Through its system of 
positive reinforcements, the society would define what is "good" and 
expect or assume that individuals would live by or reflect the good. 
Those who would attempt to live by some other set of "goods" would 
be breaking the norms of the society and would likely be looked upon 
as threats to the survival and progress of the society. This system in 
which "maximized good" equals "maximized control by positive rein-
forcements" contrasts dramatically with present societies which con-
trol human behavior primarily by prohibiting forms of harm, thus 
allowing multiple definitions of "good" to flourish. 
Assume, for example, that a Huckleberry Finn was born into an 
ideal Skinnerean society. Huck is a prankster, a wanderer, a flaunter of 
social proprieties, an exposer of social pretensions, and above all, a 
lover of idleness and a passionate hater of work. Mark Twain well 
knew that Huck Finn with all of his resistance to civilization was an 
affront to a rule-keeping, hard-working, Puritan social order. To that 
order Huck was a problem, not because he broke laws, but because he 
lived by hi~ own definition of goodness. 
Presumably in a society controlled by positive reinforcements, 
Huck Finn would be re-reinforced so that the "automatic goodness" 
which Skinner admires would be forthcoming. 57 If this did not work, 
theoretically he would not be punished or called "bad," but he might 
well be treated as insane. 58 
An objection to this depiction of the problem of individuality in an 
operant society might be that such deviations as Huck Finnism would 
never occur in an effectively reinforcing situation where individual 
freedom and autonomy were recognized as pre-scientific chimeras. But 
this objection is based on the utopian notion that operant behaviorism 
would be literally perfected and on the philosophical-scientific 
assumption that the human mind has only the uni-dimensional capac-
ities which Skinner attributes to it. 
Third, we should recall again the problem which has been high-
lighted as the virtual leitmotif of this essay, namely the contradiction 
between Skinner's theoretical noncognitivist relativism and his actual 
conceptual absolutism. Readers of Skinner's works are easily confused 
by his discussions and proposals because Skinner the ethicist is often 
hidden behind Skinner the psychologist. Skinner the psychologist is 
saying that ethics count for very little in the arena of human behavior, 
while in fact ethical issues are playing exceedingly important roles in 
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Skinner's thought. Equally problematic is the confusion not of the 
reader, but of Skinner, the writer. Skinner, I am afraid, does not 
understand himself as someone who holds to an ethical position which 
can be scrutinized and criticized, but as someone who sets forth an 
objective, empirical, scientific point of view. On the basis of such 
self-delusion, ethical responsibility can be set aside and harm can be 
perpetuated in the name of science. 
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